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Conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code:
What Constitutes Property of the
Post-Conversion Estate?

Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the authority to enact uniform laws of bankruptcy procedure.' While Congress has been fairly successful
in enacting uniform bankruptcy laws, complete uniformity remains an elusive ideal mired in nebulous interpretations and
conflicting adjudications.' In fact, bankruptcy legislation may
be incapable of complete uniformity; few statutes, if any, are
able to adequately resolve every contingent question that arises
subsequent to their prom~lgation.~
Nonetheless, uniformity
remains the standard, and nonuniform applications of the
bankruptcy statute not only flout the constitutional mandate,
they penalize some participants simply because of such fortuitous circumstances as where the bankruptcy petition is filed.
And when fortuity is replaced by forum shopping, the result is
equally troubling: a less than uniformly applied bankruptcy
statute should not reward creative debtors and their lawyers
who strategically exploit its weaknessesO4
This comment examines one particular weakness of the
current bankruptcy statute that has engendered considerable

1. U.S. CONST.art I, 8, cl. 4 ("[Congress shall have power to] establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.").
See, e.g., Arthur S. Hayes, Bankruptcy Judges Ponder Whether Heaven Can
2.
Wait, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1991, a t B1 (discussing widely inconsistent approaches
to classifying religious donations under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code).
3.
See Patrick Fitzgerald, Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) and
Undersecured Creditors: What Date for Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 1979
(1987).
4.
See In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991) ( W e are more impressed by the . . . observation that a rule of once in, always in is necessary to
discourage strategic, opportunistic -behavior that hurts creditors . . . ."); Northwest
Eng'g Co. v. United Steelworkers (In re Northwest Eng'g Co.), 863 F.2d 1313, 1318
(7th Cir. 1988); I n re Petrie, 142 B.R. 404, 405 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1992) (suggesting
that forum shopping is inappropriate for Chapter 13 cases).
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controversy. The nature of Chapter 13 estate property is generally clear and uncontested. However, when a case is converted from Chapter 13 to one under Chapter 7, the statute offers
little guidance in determining the proper composition of the
post-conversion estate. Some courts have found that the Chapter 13 estate survives conversion and constitutes the new
. ~ contrast, other courts have
Chapter 7 estate in its e n t i r e t ~ In
concluded that only those property interests the debtor possessed a t the commencement of the original Chapter 13 bankruptcy qualify as part of the new Chapter 7 estate? In short,
the proper composition of the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate
presents "a legal question on which there is no harmony of
opinion."? While most courts have held that after-acquired

Calder v. Job (In re Calder), 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1992); In re
5.
Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136,' 138 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Marcus, 128 B.R. 294, 296
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1991), affd, 140 B.R. 803 (D. Colo. 1992); In re Schmeltz, 114
B.R. 607, 610 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990); In re Daniels, 79 B.R. 88, 89 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1987); In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 715 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984); Winchester
v. Watson (In re Winchester), 46 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984); see also
Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1984);
Resendez v. Lindquist (In re Lindquist), 691 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1982); In re
Tworek, 107 B.R. 666 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Kao, 52 B.R. 452, 453-54
(Bankr. D. Or. 1985); In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189, 190 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
I n re Horton, 130 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); Tucker v. Hendren
6.
(In re Tucker), 133 B.R. 819, 821 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); In re Gorski, 85 B.R.
155, 156-57 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Thrush v. Erchenbrecher (In re
Erchenbrecher), 85 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); McCullough v. Luna
(In re Luna), 73 B.R. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Arkison v. Swift (In re Swift), 81
B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr.W.D. Wash. 1987); In re Marshall, 79 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986); In re
Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15-16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 6404 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Oliphant v. Amarillo Pantex Fed. Credit Union (In re
Oliphant), 40 B.R. 577, 578 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 1984); cf. Bobroff v. Continental
Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985).
Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
7.
1989), affd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
There is a clear split of authority regarding this issue.
An examination of developing case law in the area at issue reveals that
two divergent lines of authority have developed. A majority of the cases
considering the question of whether property of the estate in a case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 includes property acquired after the
filing of the Chapter 13 . . . [pletition have held that the Chapter 7 estate does not include property acquired by the debtor subsequent to the
filing of the original [pletition . . . . However, clearly a substantial number of cases have rejected this same conclusion and thereby included this
property in the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.
In re Leach, 101 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989); see also Blood v.
Wineburg (In re Marshall), 79 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("This proceeding concerns an issue which the Trustee acknowledges has resulted in a split

POST-CONVERSION PROPERTY
Chapter 13 estate property does not become part of the postconversion Chapter 7 e ~ t a t e this
, ~ comment argues that the
post-conversion Chapter 7 estate should include the entire
Chapter 13 estate. Part 11introduces the Bankruptcy Code and
relevant provisions of Chapter 13. Parts I11 and IV then present and analyze the nature of post-conversion Chapter 7 estates, finding that they are properly composed of the entire preconversion Chapter 13 estate.

A. Development of the Current Statute
Bankruptcy began as a collection device used to ensure
equal division of a debtor's property among his ~ r e d i t o r s .In~
deed, some have written that i n Roman times "creditors did not
merely divide the debtor's possessions, [they] took the debtor to
the plaza and divided him.'"'
In contrast to the harsh origins of creditor-favored "bankruptcy," a separate and subsequent development of bankruptcy
law emerged that was favorable to debtors. This so-called insolvency law, which was always voluntary," allowed debtors to
place their property with the court in lieu of themselves being
condemned to debtors' prison.12 While insolvency law provided
a "discharge" from debtors' prison, it did not discharge debtors
from their underlying financial obligations; creditors were still
entitled to nonimprisonment collection remedies.13
The tension between creditor-favored "bankruptcy" law and
debtor-favored "insolvency" law existed in America throughout
the nineteenth century. Congress was initially unable to reconcile these two conflicting interests, and its attempts to enact
uniform laws did not fare well.14 However, with the enact-

of decisions across the country.");In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 640 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984) ("The case law in this area is split but we will review it and attempt to
reconcile it.").
8.
See 5 COLLIERON BANKRUPTCY91 1307.01[8] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1992).
9.
Teresa A. Sullivan et. al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An
Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1098.
10.
ELIZABM'HWARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK,THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 187 (2d ed. 1991).
11.
Sullivan et al., supra note 9, at 1098.
Id.
12.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. ("Notwithstanding specific constitutional recognition that a uniform
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ment of the seminal Bankruptcy Act of 1898,15 Congress successfully created a single, uniform debtor-creditor statute that
sufficiently balanced debtors' interests in rehabilitation and a
"fresh starty"%ith creditors' interests in full repayment of
their claims.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was subsequently amended by
the Chandler Act of 193817 and ultimately repealed by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978." The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 was enacted to facilitate better administration of bankruptcies caused by our modernizing consumer society.l9 As
currently constituted, the Bankruptcy Code is organized into

bankruptcy act was vital to national interests, more than a century passed before
our legal ancestors could fashion a bankruptcy statute acceptable to competing
constituencies.") (footnote omitted). The tension between "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" interests engendered remarkable acrimony. For example, in 1898 Nevada's
Senator Stewart said that "[the proposed bankruptcy law] comes from the class of
men who are grinding the face of the poor . . . [and from] the same spirit that
hung and killed and drew and quartered women for witchery." Id. at 1099 (citing
31 CONG.REC. S2362, S2408 (1898)). One scholar wrote the following about the
development of early American bankruptcy law:
Insolvency and bankruptcy were brought together in a series of short-lived
acts. The Acts of 1800 and of 1841 were thought too generous. The former was repealed within three years and the latter lasted only about a
year. The 1867 Act was in some ways too strict and in others too liberal.
I t was extensively amended in 1874, only to be abandoned four years
later. Essentially, then, the bankruptcy "system" for the first 109 years
after the adoption of the Constitution was little more than a series of
brief legislative fiats, alternately pro-creditor and pro-debtor, accompanied
by a growing awareness that a uniform compromise law would better
serve everyone.
WARREN& WESTRROOK,supra note 10, at 188.
15.
Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. $$ 101-1330 (1988)).
16.
S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5792-93.
17.
Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. $8 101-1330 (1988)).
11 U.S.C. $5 101-1330 (1988) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"].
18.
The Code was signed into law on 6 November 1978 and became effective on 1
Odober 1979.
19.
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code recites:
The major purpose of this bill is the modernization of the bankruptcy
laws. The substantive law of bankruptcy and the current bankruptcy
system were designed in 1898, and underwent the last significant overhaul in 1938, nearly 40 years ago. Since that time there have been vast
changes in the law of debtor-creditor relations, including the wide-spread
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in the early 1960's and the
vast spread of consumer credit.
S. REP. NO. 989, supra note 16, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. a t 5788.
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eight separate chapter^.^' Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain definitions and general rules of administration that apply equally to
all four of the operative chapters.21Chapter 7 prescribes an
orderly procedure by which a bankruptcy trustee liquidates all
nonexempt22estate property and distributes the proceeds to
creditors. Once the Chapter 7 process is completed, the debtor
receives a discharge from most unpaid debts and is given a
"fresh start."23Chapter 9 allows certain municipalities to adjust their debts, and Chapter 12 provides relief for family farmers with regular annual income." Chapter 11 is rehabilitative
in nature25 and is designed for qualified b u s i n e ~ s e sthat
~~
wish to continue operating while concurrently repaying creditors through a confirmed plan of reorganization. The last chapter of the Code, Chapter 13, is discussed in the next section.

B. Chapter 13: Adjustments of Debts of an
Individual with Regular Income
1 . History
Although statutory relief for financially troubled wage
earners has been available since 1867,~'Congress determined
that the Bankruptcy Act's wage earners' plan was woefully
inadequate and that far too many debtors were being forced
into straight bankruptcy liq~idation.~'
In response to this and
20.
Chapter 1-The General Provisions, 11 U.S.C. $8 101-109 (1988); Chapter
3-Case Administration, $9 301-366; Chapter 5-Creditors, the Debtor, and Estate,
$8 501-559; Chapter 7-Liquidation, $$ 701-766; Chapter 9-Adjustments of Debts
of a Municipality, $$ 901-946; Chapter 11-Reorganization, $$ 1101-1174; Chapter
12-Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income,
$$ 1201-1231; and Chapter 13-Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular
Income, $5 1301-1330.
11 U.S.C. $ 103(a) ("Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chap21.
ters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this
title.").
22.
Debtors are entitled to exempt certain types and amounts of property from
bankruptcy court control. See generally 11 U.S.C. $ 522.
23.
See S. REP.NO. 989, supra note 16, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. a t
5792-93.
See generally 11 U.S.C. $$ 901-946, 1201-1231 (1988).
24.
25.
Chapter 11 is composed of Chapters X, XI, and XI1 of the former Bankruptcy Act. Note that chapters under the Act were designated by Roman numerals,
while chapters under the Code are designated by Arabic numerals. WARREN&
WESTRROOK,
supra note 10, a t 193.
26.
Chapter 11 is now available to qualified consumer debtors as well. See
Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2202 (1991).
27.
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 394 (1966).
28.
Id. This, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, was undesirable. The Court
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other concerns, Congress passed the Chandler Act of 1938,
which significantly enhanced the protections accorded to wage
earners who wished to restructure their debts and use future
income to avoid ultimate liquidation. The following excerpt
illustrates the purpose for Chapter XI11 of the 1898 Act, as
amended by the Chandler Act of 1938:
[Clhapter XI11 provides a highly desirable method for dealing
with the financial difficulties of individuals. It creates an
equitable and feasible way for the honest and conscientious
debtor to pay off his debts rather than having them discharged in bankruptcy.2g

Despite this optimism, the 1973 Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States3' determined that Chapter
XI11 of the Bankruptcy Act was "seriously defective" and one of
the "least understood and most erratically applied of all federal
statutes dealing with [bankr-~ptcy]."~'
Consequently, Chapter
wrote, 'In [wage earners'] proceedings, everyone [loses]-the creditors by receiving
a mere fraction of their claims, the debtor by bearing thereafter the stigma of
having been adju dged a bankrupt." Id. at 395.
H.R. REP. NO. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959). The Senate concurred:
29.
We think there can be no doubt . . . that a procedure by which a
debtor who is financially involved and unable to meet his debts as they
mature, over a period of time, works out of his involvement and pays his
debts in full is good for his creditors and good for him.
S. REP. NO. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
30.
Congress appointed this commission in 1970 to 'study and recommend
changes in bankruptcy laws." S. REP. NO. 989, supra note 16, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787. The Commission began its work in 1971 and filed its final
report with Congress in 1973. Id.
3 1. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5798-99. The legislative history
indicates that Chapter XI11 of the Act was seriously defective in five respects:
First, it does not permit some individuals with regular income to qualify,
such as small business owners or social welfare program recipients, because their principal incomes do not come from wages, salary, or commissions. Second, while the court can grant a hardship discharge, where for
example the debtor becomes totally disabled, three years must elapse
first. Third, secured creditors are dealt with erratically, tediously, and
uncertainly, resulting from a hodgepodge of state and federal statutory
provisions, bankruptcy and local rules, many conflicting reported cases
and varied local customs. Fourth, accommodation codebtors in consumer
finance are usually inexperienced relatives or coworkers, and present law
does not provide a reasonable restraint on collection from them while the
debtor's case is pending. Fifth, formal creditor voting by literally counting
written acceptances has u~ecessarily imposed substantial expense for
time, paper and uncertainty upon all concerned with only doubtful or
marginal benefits.
Id. at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5799.

'
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XI11 was repealed and replaced by Chapter 13 of the B a n h p t cy Code. Chapter 13 provides regular wage earners a simple
and effective alternative to Chapter 7 liquidation. It permits
qualified debtors32 to keep their assets, restructure their debt,
and repay their obligations under court supervision and protection, over an extended period of time.33 Moreover, Chapter
13 enables wage earners to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy and
to enjoy "temporary freedom . . . from garnishments, attachments and other harassment by creditors.yy34
2. Relevant provisions of the current statute
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is for those debtors
who "are able to keep up with their obligations in normal
times, but [who] do not prepare for emergencies or unexpected
events such as a serious illness in a family or a job l a y - ~ f f . " ~ ~
It enables wage earners to keep their assets while pledging
future earnings to satisfy current creditor demands.36 Section
109(e) of the Code defines qualified wage earners as those who
have "regular income"37 and whose total debt is within certain
statutorily prescribed limits.38
A Chapter 13 case is commenced by filing a voluntary
32.
Although Chapter 13 is statutorily limited to individual debtors, legislative
history indicates that small sole proprietorships may also file for Chapter 13 protection. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5968 (Chapter 13 . . . is limited exclusively to individuals, but
permits small sole proprietorships to use the chapter.").
See id. at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6079.
33.
34.
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966).
35.
David S. Kennedy, Chapter 13 Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 MEM. ST. U.
L. REV. 137, 138 (1989).
36.
11 U.S.C. 1326(b)-(c) (1988).
An individual with regular income is defined as an "individual whose in37.
come is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments
101(29) (1988). Contrast this with
under a plan under Chapter 13." 11 U.S.C.
the Bankruptcy Act's requirement that debtors' income be from wages, salary, or
work "for hire." See Chandler Act, ch. 575, 606, 52 Stat. 840, 931 (1938) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §$ 101-1330 (1978)).
38.
11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) reads:
Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the
filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less
than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$350,000, or an individual with regular income and such individual's
spouse, except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the
date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured
debts that aggregate less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated,
secured debts of,less than $350,000 may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of
[the Bankruptcy Code].

1112 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992
bankruptcy petition under Chapter
Within fifteen days
after filing the petition, the debtor must propose a plan of repayment4' detailing the amount of the debt to be repaid and
the terms of repayment.41 After givbg adequate notice, the
court conducts a hearing to determine whether the plan complies with the minimum statutory standards!'
If it does, it is
confirmed. A confirmed plan is usually completed in three
years; nevertheless, it may be extended to five years upon court
approval.43When the plan is successfblly completed, the debtor is deemed "rehabilitated" and is discharged from those debts
that gave rise to the initial bankruptcy!4
a. Property of the estate. The composition of a Chapter
13 estate is generally undisputed. Sections 541 and 1306 of the
Code are applied conjunctively to define the estate property,
which is created by operation of law at the time the bankruptcy

11 U.S.C. $ 301 (1988) reads:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity
that may be a debtor under such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
40.
11 U.S.C. $ 1322 governs the contents of the plan. It requires that the
debtor submit "all or such portion of the future earnings or other future income of
the debtor" to the "supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the
execution of the plan." 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(a)(l) (1988).
41.
BANKR.R. 3015(b): "The debtor may file a chapter 13 plan with the petition. If a plan is not filed with the petition, it shall be filed within 15 days thereafter, and such time shall not be further extended except for cause shown and on
notice as the court may direct."
11 U.S.C. $9 1324-1325 (1988). Section 1324 states that "[alfter notice, the
42.
court shall hold a hearing on confirmation of the plan. A party in interest may
object to confirmation of the plan."
Section 1325 requires the court to c o n f i i the plan if six elements are met: (1)
the plan must comply with each of the other provisions of Chapter 13 and with
other relevant provisions of the Code; (2) certain fees and charges must be paid
before confirmation; (3) the plan must be "proposed in good faith and not by any
means forbidden by law"; (4) it must be in the best interests of unsecured creditors-in other words, an unsecured creditor may not receive under the Chapter 13
plan an amount of money which is less than the creditor would have received
under a straight Chapter 7 liquidation; (5) secured creditors must have accepted
the plan, or the debtor must either distribute under the plan a n amount equal to
the value of the secured claim as of the effective date of the plan or surrender the
property securing the claim; and (6) the debtor must be able to make all payments
called for by the plan and in all other ways fully comply with the plan.
A plan may never exceed five years in duration. 11 U.S.C. $ 1322(c) (1988).
43.
44.
11 U.S.C. $ 1328(a) (1988). There are few debts that cannot be discharged
by a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. $ 1328(aXl)-(3); infia note 127 and
accompanying text.
39.
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petition is filed. Section 541, as the defining provision for each
of the operative chapters, sets forth the broad rule that estate
property consists of all legal and equitable interests the debtor
has in property-both tangible and intangible-at
the commencement of the case.45 However, this section generally excludes from the estate acquisitions of post-petition property,
including the debtor's earnings from "services performed . . .
after the commencement of the case."46 Nonetheless, certain
post-petition interests in property do become part of a 5 541defined estate:? such as property acquired by the estate?

45.

See 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a) (1988):

(a) The commencement of a case . . . creates an estate. Such estate is
comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section,
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community
property as of the commencement of the case that is(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of
the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for
both an allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable
claim against the debtor's spouse, to the extent that such
interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section
329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered
transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the
estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the
date of the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or
becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date(A) by bequest, device, or inheritance;
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with
debtor's spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree;
or
(C) a s beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property
of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed
by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that $ 541(a) should be broadly construed to include almost all pre-petition property. See United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983).
46.
11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(6) (1988).
47.
For example, bequests, devices, inheritances, property settlements, and life
insurance proceeds that are acquired within 180 days after the commencement of
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In contrast to 8 541's generally rigid demarcation of preand post-petition property, 5 1306 of the Code makes the Chapter 13 estate elastic and continually expandable until the case
is closed, dismissed, or converted. Section 1306 enlarges the
Chapter 13 estate by declaring:
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property
.
specified in section 541 of this title(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that
the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case
but before the case i s closed, dismissed, or converted to a
case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title whichever
occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after
the commencement of the case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7,
11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs firsta4'

Thus, the statutory language makes it abundantly clear that
before a case is converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the
property of the Chapter 13 estate includes all 8 541 property
acquired by the debtor, both pre- and post-petition.
b. Conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. A Chapter 13
case may be converted to a Chapter 7 case a t any time.50Additionally, the right of a voluntary conversion is nonwaivable;
yet if appropriate, creditors may force conversion upon a recalcitrant debtor.51Section 348 of the Code governs the effects of

the case become part of a $ 541 defined estate. See 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(5)(A)-(C).
See 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(7).
48.
49.
11 U.S.C. 8 1306(a) (1988).
11 U.S.C. $ 1307(a) (1988) ("The debtor may convert a case under this
50.
chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title at any time.").
51.
11 U.S.C. $ 1307(c) sets forth those circumstances for which conversion
would be appropriate:
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, on request of a party
in interest or the United States Trustee and after notice and a hearing,
the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter
7 of this title, or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in
the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause, including(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123
of title 28;
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326
of this title;
(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this title
and denial of a request made for additional time for fding another

11051

POST-CONVERSION PROPERTY

conversion. Subsection (a) specifies that
(a) Conversion of a case from a case under one chapter of this
title to a case under another chapter of this title constitutes
an order for relief under the chapter to which the case is converted [and] . . . does not effect a change in the date of the
filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the
order for relief.52

Section 348(a) initially appears clear and unambiguous.
Nonetheless, it has engendered considerable controversy, and
in large part, its meaning controls the character of post-petition, post-conversion property of a new Chapter 7 estate.

A Chapter 13 estate includes post-petition acquisitions of
propertys3and will generally be broader than a Chapter 7 estate. When a Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7, however, the Code is glaringly silent concerning the proper composition of the post-conversion estate.54Some courts have interpreted the Code to mean that the entire Chapter 13 estate,
including its post-petition property, survives conversion and becomes part of the new Chapter 7 estate.s5 Conversely, a strict,
mechanistic interpretation of the Code has led other courts to
conclude that upon conversion, the old Chapter 13 estate is
somehow constricted in scope and that the new Chapter 7 estate includes only that property in which the debtor had an in-

52.
53.
54.
55.

plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan;
(7) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of
this title, and denial of confirmation of a modified plan under section 1329 of this title;
(8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a
condition specified in the plan other than completion of payments
under the plan;
(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the debtor to file, within fifteen days, or such additional time as the court
may allow, after the filing of the petition commencing such case,
the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521; or
(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely
file the information required by paragraph (2) of section 521.
11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1988).
See supra part II.B.2.a.
In rn Lemon, 65 B.R. 130, 131 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1986).
See supra note 5.

.
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terest a t the date of the original Chapter 13 filing.56

A. The Language of the Statute
Any inquiry into statutory construction must begin with
'
this
the express language of the statute i t ~ e l f . ~Following
mandate, a number of courts have focused on the strict language of the Code and concluded that the post-petition, preconversion Chapter 13 property is excluded from the new Chapter 7 estate. An analysis of the "structural" argument used by
these courts reveals a recurring and deceptively simple structure.
Section 1306(a) states that
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property
specified in section 541 of this title(1)all property of the kind specified in such section that
the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case
but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a
case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title . . . .58

Although 5 1306(a) enlarges and redefines property of the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate, it becomes inapplicable when a
case is converted to Chapter 7.59 Consequently, 5 541(a)~Obecomes the sole statutory provision used to define property of
the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate? Because $541(aXl)

56.
See supra note 6.
Craig W. Dallon, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is a Consumer Debtor
57.
Eligible?, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1027, 1028. Mr. Dallon noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court has written, " 'The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself.' " Id. at 1028 n.6 (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.
259, 265 (1981) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))); see also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 469 (1989) ( K e ~ e d y J.,
, concurring) ("There is a ready
starting point, which ought to serve also as a sufficient stopping point, for this
kind of analysis: the plain language of the statute.").
58.
11 U.S.C. $ 1306(a) (1988).
59.
Section 1306 is deemed inapplicable pursuant to the language of $ 10301):
"Chapter 13 of this title applies only in a case under such chapter." 11 U.S.C.
$ 103(h) (1988). In other words, the provisions of Chapter 13 do not apply when a
case is converted from Chapter 13.
60.
See supra note 45 for the text of $ 541(a).
61.
The bankruptcy court in Blood v. Wineburg (In re Marshall), 79 B.R. 147
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987), looked a t the inapplicability of 8 1306 upon conversion and
wrote, "The operation of Code $ 1306 re-defined the property a s property of the
bankruptcy estate during the course of the Debtor's Chapter 13 case. However, the
continuing effect of Code $ 1306 ceased a s of the Debtor's voluntary conversion of
the case . . . [as] the section applies only to Chapter 13 cases." Id. a t 150; see also
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the estate t o pre-petition property, the effects
~ p e c ~ c a llimits
ly
of conversion take on a heightened sigmficance. Section 348,
which specifically governs the effects of conversion from one
chapter to another, provides that conversion "does not effect a
change in the date of the filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the order for relief."62 Therefore, according to the "structural" argument, the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate is defined as it would have been a t the original
commencement of the case, and all property acquired after that
date is excluded from the new estate.63In essence, the resulting Chapter 7 estate relates back to the date the case was first
commenced and is treated as if originally filed at that time.
Thus, the converted case under Chapter 7 is viewed as never
having been in Chapter 1 3 . ~In the oft-cited In re Lenn~n,"~
Judge Cotton summarized the argument:
[Ulpon the commencement of the Chapter 13 case, a Chapter
13 estate is created that encompasses the Section 541 specification of property of the estate as altered by Section 1306.
The Section 1306 alteration, t o include the debtor's future
earnings and property acquired after commencement of the
case, is applicable only in the Chapter 13 context. When a
case is converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the Chapter
13 estate, any plan, and the case terminate. A new Chapter 7
estate is created which relates back under Section 348(a) to
the date of the commencement (filing) of the original Chapter

In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) ("Due to $ 348(a), on conversion of a case from chapter 13 to chapter 7 the case is deemed commenced as
of the date of the original petition as a chapter 7 proceeding and consequently, the
chapter 13 estate, as defined by $ 1306, is deemed never to have existed.").
11 U.S.C. fj 348(a) (1988).
62.
Resendez v. Lindquist (In re Lindquist), 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1982); In re
63.
Gorski, 85 B.R. 155, 156 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (relying on relation-back analysis
to determine that Chapter 7 estate is determined at date of original petition);
Arkinson v. Swift (In re Swift), 81 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987);
McCullough v. Luna (In re Luna), 73 B.R. 999, 1004 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1987); In re
Peters, 44 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr. M.D. Tern. 1984); In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 64041 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986)
(stating that $ 1306-defined property of the estate does not survive conversion).
64.
See Tucker v. Hendren (In re Tucker), 133 B.R. 819, 820 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1991) ("[Ulpon conversion, a case should be treated as if it had been filed under
the chapter to which it is converted."). Consequently, since the estate has been
converted to Chapter 7, $ 1306 does not apply to, nor have any effect upon, the
determination of what constitutes property of the estate. The estate, therefore, is
determined only under 11 U.S.C. $ 541 as of the date of the original petition for
bankruptcy.
65.
65 B.R. 130 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 19%).
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13 petition. Pursuant to Section 103(h) the provisions of
Chapter 13 no longer apply. Therefore, property of this converted Chapter 7 estate must then be determined under Section 541 which is unaltered by Section 1306 or any other
section of the Bankruptcy Code?

Despite its persuasiveness, the foregoing statutory argument is not definitive. An examination of 348 reveals nothing
about the composition of a converted Chapter 7 estate? In
fact, "[llike the pieces of a mosaic, [$ 3481 must be viewed along
with the other statutory provisions of which it is intimately a
A
part, in order to properly understand the entire creati~n.'"~
careful reading of 8 348 suggests that it was indeed intended as
a source of continuity, and not a source of disruption. Accordingly, § 348 should leave matters as they existed on the date of
conver~ion.~~
If § 348 is viewed as a source of continuity, "the plain language of 5 541 easily becomes susceptible to the conclusion that
the bankruptcy estate, following conversion from Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7, is the Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate."?' The estate,
even when defined solely by 541, is not static; it is enlarged
by certain post-petition acquisitions, including property the
"estate acquires after the commencement of the case."71In other words, the estate consists of the debtor's pre-petition property as well as all post-petition property it acquires after the

66.
67.

Id. at 135.
One court has written:
I t is one thing to recognize that conversion does not affect the date upon
which the case was commenced. I t is quite another thing, however, to
draw from this principle the doctrine that the case will be treated as
though it had always proceeded under Chapter 7. Section 348(a) merely
specifies that the date of the petition, commencement, and order for relief
are unchanged. Its provisions do not mandate or necessarily imply "that
upon conversion a c&e is to be treated in all respects as if it had originally been filed under the chapter to which it has been converted."
Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 612 (Bank.. N.D. Ind. 1989) (quoting Kepler v. Independence Bank of Madison (In re Ford), 61 B.R. 913, 916
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986)), a f d , 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
68.
Id. at 612-13.
69.
In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991) ("An equally good alternative from a purely semantic perspective is that conversion from Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7 does not affect the b a n h p t [ c y ] estate but merely assures the continuity
of the case for purposes of filing fees, preferences, statutes of limitations, and so
forth.").
70.
In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. a t 613.
71.
11 U.S.C.$ 541(a)(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
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commencement of the case. Therefore, when $8 541(a)(7) and
1306 are read together, it is reasonable to conclude that all
post-petition Chapter 13 property is acquired by the estate
rather than by the debtor; as such, it would clearly be brought
into the Chapter 7 estate pursuant to 8 541(a)(7).~'This plain
and simple interpretation does not require a "strained or contorted interpretation of the consequences of onv version."^^ Unfortunately, the direct statutory language is unclear, producing
nothing more than a "semantic impasse"74from which reconciliation between the competing interpretations is virtually
impossible.

B. Reasonable Inferences fron the
Language of the Statute
In certain circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that courts may appropriately look beyond the precise language of the statute to ascertain legislative intent:
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 'compel an odd result,' we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope. T h e circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,' for
example, 'may persuade a court that Congress did not intend
words of common meaning to have their literal effect. . . .'
Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result i t apparently decrees is difficult to fathom
or where it seems inconsistent with Congress' intenti~n.'~

Specifically in a bankruptcy context, "when the plain meaning
[does] not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole' [the] Court has followed that purpose, rather than the
literal word^."'^
72.
Calder v. Job (In re Calder), 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1992).
In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at 613; see also In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 714
73.
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y.1984) (Q 348 does not purport to alter or modify the provisions
or applicability of $8 541 and 1306).
74.
In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Armstrong v.
Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1984) (when viewed in its
totality, the Code "create[s] a tension, if not a conflict" regarding the nature of the
new post-conversion Chapter 7 estate).
75.
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989)
(citations omitted).
76.
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United
States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
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No provision in the Code unequivocally defines the character of a post-conversion Chapter 7 estate; nor does the legislative history provide any real guidance.?' To resolve the issue,
then, courts armed with the power of equitable fiat have looked
to other provisions of the Code and attempted to divine its
overall purpose.78The following statutory provisions support
certain inferences regarding the unrecorded legislative intent of
Chapter 13 as it relates to this issue.

Pursuant to 8 1325(a)(4), the Chapter 13 debtor's plan
must be in the "best interests" of the Chapter 13 creditor^.'^
This requires that all creditors, whether secured or unsecured,
receive at least as much as they would have if the debtor had
originally filed a petition for Chapter 7 liquidation on the day
the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed.80 Furthermore, if a
debtor's financial condition improves during the repayment
phase of Chapter 13, he may be required to amend his confirmed plan in order to increase the amount of money received
by his creditors.81Thus, Chapter 13 creditors may reasonably
77.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Holly (In re Holly), 109 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. 1989) ("I do not believe Congress intended that monies paid to a Chapter 13
Trustee pending confirmation which clearly is property of the Chapter 13 estate
would be retroactively determined not to be property of the estate through a mechanical application of 11 U.S.C. Section 541."); In re Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1986) ("There is no obvious way to reconcile the conflicting statutory language" and the relevant "legislative history . . . is of Little help.").
78.
O'Quinn v. Brewer (In re O'QU~M), 143 B.R. 408, 413 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
1992) ("[Tlhe Court must look to the overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, and
attempt to balance the competing interests of the [dlebtors and the creditors of the
estate.").
79.
11 U.S.C. $ 1325(a)(4) (1988) (The court shall confirm the plan if "the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date.").
80. See WARREN& WESTBROOK,
supra note 10, a t 322.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1329 reads:
(a) At any time after c ~ ~ r m a t i oofn the plan but before the completion
of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of
the . . . holder of an allowed unsecured claim, t+
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan.
Examples of changed circumstances include increased income, significant inheritances, and w i ~ i n ga lottery. See Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240
(4th Cir. 1989); I n re Euerle, 70 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Koonce, 54
B.R. 643 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1985).
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expect to receive a distribution based on "the debtor's circumstances and the composition of the bankruptcy as they [existed
on the date of conversion], and not as they once were when the
petition was filed."82Moreover, "[ilt makes little sense t o recognize this expectancy so long as the case remains in Chapter
13 and then completely disregard it by excluding post-petition
property from the bankruptcy estate upon conversion to Chapter 7."83

2. 11 U.S.C.§ 348(c)
Section 348(c) authorizes the Chapter 7 trustee to assume
or reject executory contracts and leases, including those that
arose during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case.84 These
powers are only exercisable by the Chapter 7 trustee if postpetition, pre-conversion contracts and leases survive the conversion and become part of the new Chapter 7 estate; otherwise, § 348(c) is rendered superfluous. One court wrote:
Subsection (c) plainly authorizes the Chapter 7 trustee to
assume or reject all pre-conversion executory contracts or
unexpired leases of the Chapter 13 debtor, including those
arising post-petition and even post-confirmation; an impossibility if those interests were not a part of the estate following
confirrnati~n.~~

3. 11 U.S.C. 348(d)
Section 348(d) states that post-petition claims against the
Chapter 13 estate shall be treated as if they had arisen immediately before the original petition date and are thus dischargeable in Chapter 13. It reads:
A claim against the estate or the debtor t h a t arises after the

82.
See Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 613-14 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1989) (citing In re Arnold, 869 F.2d at 242-43) ("Congress . . . intended . . .
that the debtor repay his creditors to the extent of his capability during the Chapter 13 period . . . . When a debtor's financial fortunes improve, the creditors
should share some of the wealth."), affd, 135 B.R. 321 N.D. Ind. 1990), afd, 951
F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 614.
83.
84.
11 U.S.C. $ 348(c) (1988) reads: "[Section 365(d), dealing with executory
contracts and unexpired leases] of this title appl[ies] in a case that has been converted under section 706, 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, as if the conversion
order were the order for relief."
85.
In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 714 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984).
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order for relief but before conversion in a case that is converted under section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title . . . shall be
treated for all purposes as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.86

According to at least one court, this "provide[s] debtors with a n
inducement to attempt to reorganize under Chapter 13 since
post-petition claims could be discharged upon a failed reorgani~ a t i o n . "By
~ ~analogy then, it may be argued that the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate should be constituted in a manner
that encourages debtors to first seek Chapter 13 rehabilitation
and protection. Therefore, 8 348(d) is arguably an incentive for
debtors to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7.
Yet given the Code as a whole, it seems incongruent that
its drafters would have enacted this provision if they did not
also intend that property acquired by the debtor during the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy be available to pay those post-petition
claims. Chapter 13 creditors are guaranteed to receive a t least
as much as they would have had their debtors chosen Chapter
7 liquidation. If post-petition claims are satisfied by pre-petition resources, the distribution to pre-petition creditors will
likely be decreased; the size of the estate has remained the
same but the number and amount of claims has quite possibly
increased. It is only reasonable that debtors be required to
place post-petition property in the Chapter 7 estate if they are
going to be relieved from the liability of post-petition claims.88
Because Chapter 13 creditors risk deterioration of their claims
during bankruptcy, they "should also have the opportunity to
share any benefits which might flow from an improvement'y89
their debtor experiences during the case.
4. Bankruptcy Rule 1019(5)

Bankruptcy Rule 1019(5) requires the Chapter 13 trustee
to turn the entire Chapter 13 estate over to the Chapter 7

86.
11 U.S.C. $ 348(d) (1988).
87.
In re Schmeltz, 114 B.R. 607, 609 (Bankr. N.D.Ind. 1990).
88.
The Wanderlich court states that "subdivision (d) hardly would elect to
treat post-petition creditors of the Chapter 13 debtor as being pre-petition claimants after conversion to Chapter 7, if post-petition cash deposits or property which
the debtor acquired as a result of credit transactions were not to be included in
the debtor's Chapter 7 estate." 36 B.R. at 714.
89.
Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 615 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1989).
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trustee upon conversion. It reads:
[When a chapter 13 case has been converted to a chapter 7
case and] after qualification of, or assumption of duties by the
chapter 7 trustee, any debtor in possession or trustee previously acting in the . . . Chapter 13 case shall, forthwith, unless otherwise ordered, turn over to the chapter 7 trustee all
records and property of the estate in the possession or control
of the debtor in possession or trustee.'

While the Rule contains minimal substantive content, it quite
possibly envisions a transfer of the entire Chapter 13 estate
from the Chapter 13 trustee to the Chapter 7 trustee. There is
no other administrative mechanism in the Code by which
Chapter 13 property that is excluded from the new Chapter 7
may be "returned" to the debtor.
5. 11 U.S.C. $$361-362

.

The filing of a Chapter 13 petition triggers a n automatic
stay against virtually all creditor collection and lien enforcement attempt^.^' Because Chapter 13 debtors are entitled, at
least initially, to keep their assets and satisfy their debts out of
future income, the stay is extremely important for those debtors who are capable of confirming and completing a plan, but
who are in jeopardy of losing their assets to secured creditors.
The stay, however, is not absolute; secured creditors may obtain relief if they meet certain statutorily prescribed conditi on^.'^ In determining whether a particular secured creditor
is entitled to relief from the stay, a court usually examines the
debtor's equity in the property and the extent to which the
property is needed for rehabilitati~n.'~
Additionally, two other issues are considered by courts i n
determining whether to grant a secured creditor relief from the
stay.94 First, courts consider whether the debtor's proposed
repayment plan "adequately protects" the secured creditor's
~ o l l a t e r a l Though
.~~
"adequate protection" is acult
to define
90.
BANKH.R. 1019(5) (emphasis added).
91.
See 11 U.S.C. $6 103(a), 362(a)(l)-(8) (1988).
See generally 11 U.S.C. $ 362(d) (1988).
92.
93.
11 U.S.C. $ 362(d)(2) (1988).
94.
See WARREN
& WESTBROOK,
supra note 10, at 303. See generally 11 U.S.C.
$ 362(d)(1) (1988), and BANKR.R. 4001(a)(l), which set forth the procedure for
requesting relief from the stay.
95.
WARREN
& WESTBROOK,
supra note 10, at 303.
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pre~isely,'~
its general meaning is clear: a secured creditor's
claim, as ascertained by the collateral's value a t the time the
A Chapter 7
petition is first filed, may never be dimini~hed.'~
liquidation provides a useful illustration. When a Chapter 7
petition is filed, fully secured creditors are able t o obtain relief
from the stay by repossessing the collateral in satisfaction of
the debts they are owed. In contrast, a Chapter 13 fully secured creditor is unable to seize its collateral in satisfaction of
the debt it is owed; the creditor must simply stand by while the
debtor continues t o use the collateral, which often results in
damage, depreciation, or general collateral devaluation. Because of these troubling possibilities, the Code requires Chapter 13 debtors to adequately protect the value of their secured
creditors' ~ o l l a t e r a l . ~ ~
Second, courts consider whether the debtor is able to furnish "adequate payment" to the creditors during the repayment
period of the proposed plan." Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)of the
Bankruptcy Code states that the debtor's proposed plan must
provide for payment to secured creditors (throughout the duration of the repayment period) equal to the present value'00 of
their claims as they existed at the time the plan was confirmed, plus interest.''' Thus, while "adequate protection" is
concerned with declining collateral values, "adequate payment"
focuses on the amount a secured party should receive when its
debtor is successful in making all payments called for by the
plan.'02 In short, a court may lift the automatic stay and allow secured creditors t o repossess their collateral if the court
doubts the debtor's ability to fulf"ill either of these two requirements.
"Adequate protection is not defined in the Code." In re Alyucan Interstate
96.
Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
97.
See generally 11 U.S.C. 8 361 (1988).
98.
This becomes important when the debtor defaults on the Chapter 13 plan
and the secured creditor's only remedy is to then seize the collateral. Methods of
adequately protecting collateral are found in 11 U.S.C. $ 361.
99.
WAF~REN
& WESTBROOK,
supra note 10, a t 303.
100.
Simply explained, present value means that because a dollar can be used to
create additional value, it is worth more today than it will be tomorrow. Present
value is generally calculated by discounting the h t u r e payment by the rate of
return available to the investor over the specified period.
101.
11 U.S.C. 8 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988) ("[The court shall confirm the plan if,
with respect to each allowed secured claim] the value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is
not less than the allowed amount of such claim.").
102. Id.
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Chapter 7 debtors are required to relinquish ownership
and control of their nonexempt property to the Chapter 7 trustee. In contrast, Chapter 13 debtors continue to own and control
their property because they "adequately protect" the collateral
by immediately making payments to the Chapter 13 trustee.lo3 In most Chapter 13 cases, post-petition payments to the
Chapter 13 trustee represent the only "adequate protection" secured creditors receive from their debtors.lo4 As such, it
seems patently unfair to stay the collection efforts of creditors,
under the guise of adequately protecting their collateral's value, while a t the same time allowing debtors to use, deplete, or
potentially damage the collateral. This is particularly applicable, for example, when the "adequate protection" given to creditors is returned to the debtors once the case is converted to
Chapter 7.
In In re Holly,1o5the Chapter 13 trustee held post-petition, pre-conversion payments made by the debtor pursuant to
his plan of restructured payments. After considering whether
the plan payments should be returned to the debtor, the court
observed that "[elach secured creditor's interest in its collateral
[was] impaired to the extent that i t . . . received no payment
and [was] prevented from foreclosing its security interest by
the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)."lo6 It follows,

103. See 11 U.S.C. 5 1326(a) (1988). The debtor must file a plan of restructured
debt payments within 15 days of filing the Chapter 13 petition. See BANKR.R.
301503). Regardless of whether the plan has been confirmed, the debtor must begin
making plan payments within 30 days after the petition has been filed. In the
event that the plan is not confirmed, the Chapter 13 trustee is required to return
the plan payments to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. $ 1326(a)(l)-(2) (1988).
104. According to one court:
In many and maybe most of the chapter 13 cases . . . cash payments
through the trustee pursuant to the plan represent the only "adequate
protection" provided for creditors with secured claims . . . . [Mlotions by
secured claimants to lift the automatic stay of $ 362(a) for lack of adequate protection have been and will be denied in that the claimants have
been provided adequate protection by way of cash payments through the
trustee.

....

Giving the undistributed funds, upon dismissal or conversion, to someone other than the creditors provided for by the plan would be unfair to
those creditors, and particularly to the secured creditors who have been
promised these funds and who have relied on them for the protection
afforded them under 5 361(1) of the Code.
In re Rutenbeck, 78 B.R. 912, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
105.
109 B.R. 524 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989).
106. Id. at 525.
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then, that when " 'adequate protection' proves to be inadequate,
all affected secured creditors are entitled to alternative compensation . . . . They are entitled to a pro-rata satisfaction of
those claims out of the monies which the Debtor has paid to
the Tr~stee.'~'~'
The court refused to believe that Congress intended Chapter 13 property to cease being estate property
simply because of a "mechanical application of 11 U.S.C.
$ 541."lo8 In sum, "adequate" protection and payment for
Chapter 13 creditors depend, at least in part, on the nature
and ever-increasing size of the post-petition estate. If post-conversion Chapter 7 estates are limited to pre-petition property,
adequate protection and payment may be illusory concepts.

IV. ANALYSISOF THE CONTROVERSY
The issue of whether post-petition, pre-conversion Chapter
13 property becomes part of the new Chapter 7 estate appears
convoluted, and the conflicting decisions seem irreconcilable.
Nevertheless, it is imperative that the issue be resolved, if only
to comply with the constitutional mandate for uniformity. The
structural argument that 8 541 expressly limits the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate to pre-petition property is somewhat
compelling. However, the structural argument fails to account
for its result-that the Chapter 13 estate magically ceases to
exist when a Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7. In
reality, the Code does not specify the composition of the postconversion estate; in fact, if anything, the Code implies that the
post-conversion Chapter 7 estate is not limited to pre-petition
property. Recent decisions from the courts of appeals have
corroborated this position, holding that post-conversion Chapter
7 estates include all property of the pre-conversion Chapter 13
estate.

A. The Recent Cases
Courts frequently rely upon In re ~ybrook'O~
for the proposition that the entire Chapter 13 estate sunrives conversion to

107. Id. In re Barbee, 82 B.R. 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), came to the same
conclusion. The court found that "[s]ection 1326(a) is clearly intended to provide a
fund out of which the costs of a failed Chapter 13 case can be paid. It in effect
shiRs the risk of failure from the trustee to the debtor." Id. at 473.
108. In re Holly, 109 B.R. at 526.
109.
Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989),
afd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Chapter 7. In In re Lybrook, the debtors received an inheritance of more than $70,000 after they filed their petition for
Chapter 13 relief, but before the case was converted t o Chapter
7."' While the inheritance was unquestionably part of the
original Chapter 13 estate, there was some question as t o
whether it continued t o be part of the bankruptcy estate following conversion t o Chapter 7. After a detailed analysis of Code
construction and policy, the bankruptcy court held that the
inheritance was part of the new Chapter 7 estate."'
On appeal, the debtors relinquished their statutory interpretation argument and attempted to shield the inheritance
from their creditors on policy grounds. The debtors argued that
Congress's desire to encourage the use of Chapter 13, in lieu of
Chapter 7, would be "undermined" if their post-petition inheritance was not excluded from the new Chapter 7 estate.ll2 The
debtors referred t o the legislative history of Chapter 13, which
indicates that Chapter 13 is designed as the ideal alternative to
Chapter 7 liquidation. l3 Judge Posner, though, was unconvinced:
[Ilt is not clear that the Lybrooks' position would on balance
encourage rather than discourage this alternative. Their position makes an initial filing under Chapter 13 less risky, all
right, but it also encourages conversions fiom Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7. In the end, a s many or more personal bankruptcies may end up in Chapter 7 as would be the case if property
once it was included in the Chapter 13 estate remained in the
bankrupt estate following conversion.
We are more impressed . . . that a rule of once in, always
in is necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior
that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interest
of debtors. A debtor who lacks confidence that he can actually
work his way out of his financial hole by payments under a
110. Id. The debtors received the inheritance more than 180 days after the original petition, thereby eliminating the possibility that it would have been part of an
originally filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. .%e 11 U.S.C. 8 541(a)(5)(A) (1988).
111. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R.a t 615.
112.
951 F.2d a t 136-37.
113. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, a t 116, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6076-80;
see also In re L e ~ o n 65
, B.R. 130, 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) ("The statutory
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code reflects a congressional intent to make attractive
and encourage greater use, which must be voluntary, of Chapter 13 rehabilitation
and creditor payment, rather than Chapter 7 liquidation with little or no creditor
payment. When Congress enacted Chapter 13, it demonstrated its concern over the
failure of old Chapter XI11 of the Bankruptcy Act to encourage consumer debtor
use of the chapter for creditor payment as opposed to straight liquidation.").

1128 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992
Chapter 13 plan will nevertheless have an incentive to proceed under that chapter as long as he can, holding his creditors a t bay and thus staving off the evil day when they seize
his assets. For he knows that if his position deteriorates further that it is the creditors who will bear the loss, while if he
should get lucky and win a lottery or a legal judgment, or
inherit money (after 180 days have passed since the filing of
the petition), he will be able to keep his windfall by the simple expedient of converting to Chapter 7.114

The Tenth Circuit's subsequent decision in In re
C ~ l d e r , "which
~
relies on In re Lybrook, provides further support for this conclusion. Calder was an experienced bankruptcy
attorney who originally filed a petition for relief under Chapter
7 in 1986. His case was converted t o Chapter 13 in 1989, and
then reconverted to Chapter 7 in 1990. Calder appealed the
district court's decision to include approximately $60,000 of
post-petition, pre-conversion wages in the reconverted Chapter
7 estate.
While conceding that the money was properly included in
the Chapter 13 estate, Calder argued on appeal that the property of the new Chapter 7 estate should be determined as of
the date of his original petition in bankruptcy.ll6 After reviewing the interplay between @ 541, 1306, and 348, the Tenth
Circuit held that "a proper reading of 5 348 indicates that it is
not a source of disruption but, instead, preserves the continuity
of the bankruptcy proceedings.""' The court based its decision, at least in part, on the statutory language of $8 1306 and
541(a)(7). Section 1306 makes it clear, reasoned the court, that
after-acquired property and the debtor's post-petition earnings
are included in the Chapter 13 estate. When the case is converted t o Chapter 7, § 541(a)(7) includes in the post-conversion
estate "[alny interest in property that the estate acquires after
the commencement of the case." Reading these two provisions
together, the Court concluded that "all property in plaintiffs
Chapter 13 estate-including any funds included pursuant t o
$ 1306-are part of the postconversion Chapter 7 estate.""'
114.
115.
116.
117.

951 F.2d at 137-38.
973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 864.
Id. at 866 (quoting Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 613
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), afd, 951 F.2d 136
(7th Cir. 1991).
118. Id.

POST-CONVERSION PROPERTY
In sum, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, relying respectively on
policy grounds and statutory construction, determined that all
Chapter 13 estate property should be included in post-conversion Chapter 7 estates.

B. Further Policy Considerations
Some courts have suggested that depriving debtors of their
post-petition, pre-conversion property may discourage them
from attempting Chapter 13 rehabilitation^."^ I n essence,
these courts argue that it is incongruent to encourage the use
of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 liquidation, yet penalize debtors
who first attempted and failed a t Chapter 13 rehabilitation.
These courts argue that debtors are penalized when their postpetition property survives conversion and becomes part of the
new Chapter 7 estate because that same property would have
been excluded from bankruptcy court control had the debtors
initially filed a petition under Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court
in Hannan v. Kirshenbaum (In re H ~ n n a n ) 'wrote
~ ~ the following about the propensity conversion may have to penalize
debtors:
When a Chapter 13 plan does not work out, the debtor has
the privilege of converting to Chapter 7, and when he exercises that right, no reason of policy suggests itself why the creditors [and the debtor] should not be put back in precisely the
same position as they would been had the debtor never
sought to repay his debts by filing under Chapter 13.121

The foregoing argument fails to take into account the
Code's numerous incentives to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter
7. For example, Chapter 13 debtors are able to keep property
that is encumbered by preexisting security interests, often by

119. E.g., H a m a n v. Kirshenbaum (In re Hannan), 24 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15-16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (deciding that it was
within the public interest to encourage good faith Chapter 13 rehabilitations, and
as such, "it would not be fair to penalize [the debtors] by disposing of monies
which clearly would have been [excluded from the estate had it been originally
filed under Chapter 71."); Tucker v. Hendren (In re Tucker), 133 B.R. 819, 821
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) ("Under $ 1326(a)(2) the Debtors could have obtained their
plan payments at any time prior to conversion since no plan was confirmed. No
statutory reason exists why the result should be any different when the demand
for return of the plan payments is made after conversion to Chapter 7.").
120.
24 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
121. Id. at 692.
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making lower monthly payments to their creditors.'" It simply does not follow that prospective Chapter 13 debtors, if given
the choice of losing their assets immediately or possibly losing
them later, would choose to lose them immediately by filing
under Chapter 7.
Furthermore, debtors who own their own homes have an
incentive to file under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.123
Under Chapter 13, courts have traditionally allowed debtors to
satisfy arrears within a reasonable time and lower their mortgage balance through a controversial technique called "lien
stripping."'" On the other hand, Chapter 7 debtors with equ i t ~ in
' ~their
~ homes are statutorily required to use that equity to satisfy their debts, often culminating in the loss of their
home. But possibly most important of all, Congress provided a
much broader discharge from debts in cases under Chapter 13
t h a n i t did in cases under Chapter 7. Of the 12
nondischargeable debts of Chapter 7,126 only three are
nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.12' Therefore, while
debtors may risk losing some after-acquired property, this risk
alone will not dissuade them from filing under Chapter 13.
Rather, it is far more likely that debtors will choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 because of the foregoing statutory incentives and because it allows them to keep property they would
otherwise have to relinquish to the Chapter 7 trustee. Finally,
if debtors are entitled to limit their converted estates to prepetition property, they may be encouraged to first fde a Chapter 13 petition, and if convenient, later convert to Chapter 7.
This incentive to convert from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is irreconcilable with Congress's desire that debtors perform Chapter
13 rehabilitation.
122. See 11 U.S.C. 8 1322(b)(2) (1988).
123. WARREN& WESTBROOK,supra note 10, at 367. Approximately 52% of all
debtors own their own homes. Id.
124. Id. 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(b)(2) allows Chapter 13 debtors to reduce their
oversecured debts to an amount commensurate with their collateral's value. In a
move "fraught with controversy," some courts have allowed debtors to reduce their
home mortgages in much the same way. WARREN& WESTBROOK,supra note 10, at
3 18.
125. Debtors are entitled to exempt the first $7,500 of equity pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(l) (1988).
126. See 11 U.S.C. 8 523(a)(l)-(12) (1988).
127. See 11 U.S.C. 8 1328(a) (1988). Nondischargeable debts in a Chapter 13
proceeding include some types of student loans, debts for alimony or support, and
debts incurred while driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a)(2) (1988).
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Excluding post-petition property from the post-conversion
Chapter 7 estate would "build a strange anomaly into the
Bankruptcy Code."128 Debtors would be able to use Chapter
13 for their own convenience, yet convert to Chapter 7 when
Chapter 13 becomes unattractive. Two examples are illustrative. First, if a debtor's financial condition improves and the
court orders a plan modification for the benefit of the debtor's
creditors, the debtor may simply convert to Chapter 7 and
retain the new property that motivated the court to order the
modifi~ation.'~~
Court orders are not issued merely to be
flouted a t the debtor's discretion.
Second, consider the hypothetical Chapter 13 debtor who
wins one million dollars i n the state lottery. As a result of his
new wealth, the debtor incurs substantial post-petition debt
and the bankruptcy court orders him to modify his Chapter 13
repayment plan for the benefit of his creditors. Not only can
the debtor discharge his post-petition debts pursuant to
# 348(d), he may also convert his case to Chapter 7 and exclude
his lottery winnings from the new Chapter 7 estate. This result
is entirely indefensible.
Similarly, the scope of the debtor's discharge is the same
whether the case is converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed and
immediately followed by a subsequent Chapter 7 petition; in
either case, claims are equally dischargeable regardless of
when they arose.130 Congress specifically intended this to be
the case.13' When the case is dismissed and a new petition is
filed, the debtor's post-petition Chapter 13 property is unquestionably part of the new Chapter 7 estate. Otherwise, Chapter
13 debtors would have a n incentive to convert their cases to
Chapter 7, rather than having them dismissed. They could
exclude post-petition property upon conversion, but be forced to
include it in a newly refiled Chapter 7 case. The Seventh Circuit, in I n re Northwest Engineering Co.,lS2 ruled that the
Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted in a way that avoids
the creation of strategic incentives. Consequently, debtors

128.
Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1989), affd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), afd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
129. Id. The right to a voluntary conversion is absolute. 11 U.S.C. 5 1307(a)
(1988).
130.
In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at 614.
131. Id. (citing 124 CONG.REC. HI1098 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 9 Bkr-L Ed 5 81:3, at 37 (1979)).
132.
863 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1988).
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should not be encouraged to choose conversion over dismissal.
Even though the choice between conversion and dismissal
will have no impact on the debtor's discharge, it has a tremendous impact on creditors. When the post-conversion estate is
limited to pre-petition property, the amount of property available to satisfy claims may be substantially less. Debtors and
creditors should enjoy the same results whether the case is
converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 or is dismissed from
Chapter 13 and followed by a separate petition under Chapter
7. The discharge is the same; the price of that discharge should
also be the same.
If a debtor fails to meet the standards of Chapter 13, the
court may dismiss or convert his case, "whichever is in the best
interests of creditors and the estate."133 This implies that
there will be a difference between dismissal and conversion,
and that one of the two will better serve the estate and its
creditors. I t is obviously in the best interests of creditors to
define Chapter 7 estate property as of the conversion date.
Likewise, it is obviously in the best interests of the estate to be
converted instead of hsmissed because only by conversion are
post-petition claims discharged pursuant to 5 348(d). When
post-petition property is nonexistent or insignificant, it may be
best to grant a dismissal.
Finally, the structural argument fails to consider the dual
debtor-creditor nature of the Code. In most cases, there is no
question that debtors are better off when their post-conversion
estates are limited to pre-petition property. They keep and use
pre-petition property while shielding post-petition property
from creditor control. And, in the event their Chapter 13 case
fails, they are treated as having initially filed a liquidation
petition. Creditors, meanwhile, are forced to bear the costs of
successful and unsuccessful Chapter 13 proceedings.

Federal law should treat similarly situated persons fairly;
despite its merits, the Bankruptcy Code fails in this regard.
The Code is susceptible to disparate applications, and as a
result, similarly situated debtors whose cases are converted
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 have been treated hssimilarly.
The principle consideration behind the bankruptcy statute is

133.

11 U.S.C.9 1307(c) (1988).
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one of balance: debtors need time to fulfill their obligations or,
in the alternative, to receive a fresh start; creditors reasonably
expect to collect from their debtors, and if appropriate, to receive an increase in their financial return as their debtors'
situations improve.
Congress enacted a statute that needs further refinement.
The conclusion that the entire Chapter 13 estate survives conversion and becomes the Chapter 7 estate is consonant with
other Code provisions and well within the policy considerations
underlying bankruptcy legislation. After reviewing the Code's
ambiguities and the equitable principles involved, thoughtful
courts should follow the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and hold
that post-conversion Chapter 7 estates are properly composed
of the entire pre-conversion Chapter 13 estate.

David A. Hardy
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